inclined to dismiss the influence of cartel policy, and why the possibility has never been pressed, comes from the presumption that firms would choose merger over price fixing if they could because merger avoids a host of problems that cartels face. Why should monopoly-minded firms have to be forced to merge at the point of a bayonet? The answer, of course, is that firms will prefer cartels to merger if the gains are greater. If there are diseconomies from merger and if the available monopoly gains are not large, the preferred choice may very well be cartelization, making it at least conceivable that the introduction of a law against price fixing swung the balance in favor of merger.
This argument assumes that the motive for both cartels and mergers is monopoly gain. However, the idea that the motive may not be monopoly at all also seems worth exploring, especially since many firms seemed to prefer the vagaries of a cartel agreement to the more secure coordination of a merged existence. For example, cartels and mergers may be cooperative attempts to solve market problems that do not have a noncooperative solution. One focus of such an explanation, and the one that I will emphasize, is the integer or fixed-cost problem. This is a well-known instance in which there is no competitive equilibrium. As always, the choice between two theories should be governed by their ability to explain the facts, and I hope to show that an explanation based on the desire to remedy the problems posed by fixed costs has at least as much going for it in the case of the Great Merger Wave as an explanation based on simple greed.
I should emphasize that these two explanations, alone or together, do not provide a general theory of merger; there are certainly reasons other than a desire for monopoly gain or a desire to remedy market failure stemming from fixed costs why firms might merge. My primary aim is to see whether a reasonable theoretical foundation can be constructed for the view that changes in antitrust policy caused the large year-to-year variations in merger activity that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that converted many cartels to single-firm organization. This paper is not an attempt to explain horizontal mergers in general, and I do not rule out the possibility that something like U.S. Steel would have been formed eventually even if the antitrust laws had never been passed.
This study is organized as follows: Section II reviews two explanations for cartels and merger and summarizes their implications for the organization of an industry. Section III covers developments in turn-of-thecentury antitrust policy, and Section IV presents data on the U.S. and U.K. mergers. Section V looks at two prominent industries that participated in the 1898-1902 merger wave-railroading and iron and steel-and reviews evidence from several other industries where there seems to have 79 been a link between antitrust and merger. Section VI considers the objections that have been raised against the existence of such a link, and Section VII looks at the possibility of a connection between antitrust and merger for the period 1905-50. It also contains a statistical investigation for the years 1895-1920 of the relation among merger, antitrust policy, and stock prices.
II. MONOPOLY, COLLUSI ON, AND I NDUSTRY ORGANI ZATI ON
The familiar explanation for cartels and anticompetitive mergers begins, at least implicitly, with the analysis of competitive markets and emphasizes the gains from competition. Competition between firms brings prices down to marginal cost, and the entry and exit of firms leads to prices that cover the costs of the marginal firm in the long run. It is useful to recall two of the key assumptions in this analysis: average costs of the firm decrease to a certain point and then increase, and the number of firms is "large." If the firms in an industry can get together and form a cartel or merge, they may be able to restrict output and raise prices at the expense of the consumer.
The analysis of cartels has focused on the costs and benefits of collusion, often as a subtopic in the economics of information. Ultimately, of course, an increase in price will lead to new entry, but short of provoking new entry, the gains accruing to monopoly-minded producers are limited by the difficulty of agreeing on a division of the profits and of detecting cheating and enforcing collusion. 2 In particular, the fewer the number of sellers in an industry, the easier it is for them to collude. It should be noted, however, that there is a certain tension or inconsistency between the assumption of large numbers of firms in the model of competition used as a benchmark and the result that collusion is more likely when the number of firms is small. Various other factors linked with the difficulty or ease of collusion have also been mentioned, but the number of firms appears on every list.
It might seem from this sketch of models of collusion that the firms in an industry bent on getting monopoly gain will prefer merger to price fixing because cartels often break down and because the costs of agreeing on a division of prospective monopoly gains are incurred only once, while cartel enforcement costs are a recurring expense. This is a natural supposition, and attempts to explain the turn-of-the-century mergers in many cartelized industries have focused on developments that made it easier to create and operate large firms-changes in corporation law, improvements in communication and transportation, and the growth of organized exchanges-instead of changes that raised the costs of cartelization. 4 However, the emphasis on factors that facilitated the formation of large firms may still be wrong if the diseconomies or other costs associated with merger are sufficiently large and if the prospective monopoly gains are small.
For example, suppose that a monopolistically inclined industry faces inelastic demand up to a certain price and infinitely elastic foreign or potential competition above that price. Also assume that there are some, perhaps only slight, diseconomies from merger. 5 This is a simple model: the profit-maximizing price for both the cartel and the merged firm will be just below the import price even if the merged firm's costs are higher. But consider the implications. If the cartel breaks down 50 percent of the time, the industry will remain a cartel only if the incremental costs of merger (per time period) are more than one-half the current monopoly gain. This implies either substantial diseconomies of scale or fairly effective potential competition. For a given cost penalty from merger, the incremental gain from cartelization over merger increases as the durability of the cartel increases and as the cartel's current margin decreases. For some combination of low-enough monopoly returns and high-enough cost penalties from merger, cartels will be preferred. 6 In short, there is tion, standardization of the product, the degree of heterogeneity in vertical integration across firms, whether nonprice competition is important, the variability of demand, and the use of sealed bids. 4 The literature on this subject is discussed in Section VI below. 5 These assumptions constitute a modification of those employed in George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, in The Organization of Industry 95 (1968) , which assumes no diseconomies from merger and a less than instantaneous supply response to prices above the competitive level. 6 Let P be the price above which the cartel or merged firm faces competition, C the constant unit costs of the cartel, M the constant unit costs of the merged firm, and x the probability that the cartel will function in a given period. The expected gains to merger per unit of output each period are P -M -x(P -C), assuming that the cartel just covers costs when it breaks down. Clearly, these gains are directly related to the monopoly margin and inversely related to the durability of the cartel and the cartel margin. Specifically, the cartel ANTI TRUST POLI CY AND MERGERS 81 nothing inherently suspicious about a world in which firms prefer cartels to merger as a way of extracting monopoly rents and in which the enforcement of a law against price fixing leads those firms to merge.
So far, I have assumed that the aim of cartels and merger is monopoly profit, but there is another explanation that seems worth pursuing for two reasons. First, it avoids the inconsistency between the assumption of large numbers of competitors in the theory of competition and the result that collusion is manageable only with small numbers of competitors. In other words, the possibility of competition is no longer to be assumed but deduced. Second, it provides testable implications about the circumstances under which collusion will take place and the forms that collusion assumes, and these implications differ in some respects from those offered in the more familiar theory.
The strategy here is to make necessary and reasonable assumptions about the technology and demand of a market and then try to infer what will happen under a regime of competition and independent action. This leads very quickly to a well-known impasse in oligopoly and game theory, but it serves to illustrate that the problems actually faced by firms may be more complicated than the model of competition implies. I could present technical results on this point, but the first-time reader will probably get more out of an example. The proposed solution to the impasse is a cooperative equilibrium, and although I will not specify the allocation of returns in that equilibrium, I will propose that certain economic institutions-cartels, merged firms, tacit collusion (if it exists), and government regulation-may constitute such cooperative outcomes.
Suppose three mutual strangers are hailing cabs at a street corner, and all three want to get to the airport. Each is willing to pay $7. Two (unregulated) cabs, each assumed to have capacity for two passengers, show up at the same time. Each cabbie is willing to drive to the airport for $6 with either one or two passengers. The marginal cost of carrying the second passenger is zero, the three passengers are jointly willing to pay $21, and the cost of two cabs is $12. The optimal solution calls for both cabs to go, implying a net social gain of $9.
One way to explore this situation is to set up a competitive algorithma set of rules that embody the notion of competition and independent action-and then trace the consequences. The purpose of this algorithm, it should be stressed, is not to offer a prediction of what will happen in such situations, but to illustrate that there is no competitive allocation of will be preferred if P -M < x{P -C) or P -C < (Af -C)/(l -x), where P ~ C is the cartel margin and M -C is the per unit cost penalty from merger. A law against cartels can be thought of as raising C and lowering x.
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returns to cabbies and prospective passengers. Assume that cabbies propose fares, passengers can accept or reject those proposals, and that proposals are not binding until all are convinced that no alternative proposal offers a superior outcome. If one cabbie proposes a fare of $5.00, the other would find it in his interest to offer, say, $4.50. This competition would continue until the offers reached $3.00, and one cabbie dropped out. The winner in this bidding contest could then raise his price to the profit-maximizing $7.00 which would allocate seats among the customers. But this would pull the loser back into the market, returning us to the beginning.
Another way of illuminating the difficulty for competition, one that avoids what may be the counterintuitive notion of seemingly endless recontracting, is to focus on the returns available to passengers and cabbies. The obstacle to a competitive outcome is that while the "best" solution from the point of view of any two passengers and one cabbie provides the highest average returns available, all cabbies and all passengers cannot obtain these returns. For example, the maximum return available to the three passengers is $9, or $3 each. Equal returns to the passengers could come about if all three passengers bargain collectively, but any two always have an incentive to band together and hire an idle cab, assuring themselves as much as $4 surplus each.
The difficulty posed in this example shows up under a wide range of cost and demand conditions and has been in the literature for at least fifty years. . The integer problem can emerge because of uncertain and variable demand and because larger production units have lower average costs than smaller units beyond some minimal capacity that is "large" relative to the market. So, in the example above, if three passengers showed up together in every market period, cabs serving that street corner would have seats for three passengers, with average costs presumably no higher than for cabs with only two seats. With contestability, the price charged would result in revenues that just cover costs. On the other hand, if cabs with one seat had the same costs per passenger as larger cabs, all cabs could have one seat and there would be no integer problem regardless of how many passengers showed up. It is true that the integer problem disappears if plants have "flat-bottomed" average cost curves. ANTI TRUST POLI CY AND MERGERS 83 bargaining rounds described above to conclude that prices in an industry with U-shaped average cost curves would oscillate. 8 Other results are also conceivable. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium calls for each cabbie to offer the number of seats that provides the most profit, acting under the assumption that the other driver does not react to the first driver's actions. Each driver would offer one seat. (If passengers were divisible, each would offer 1.49 seats.) Although this seems possible, it is hardly inevitable.
Instead of looking for a noncooperative or competitive equilibrium, it may be useful to think of this situation as one in which a cooperative solution can be employed. There are several possibilities. In the example here, the passengers could present a united front to the two cabbies and split the surplus between them. As an alternative, the cabbies could agree to charge $7 per passenger and split the resulting profit of $9 between them. The cabs could also merge. Yet another possibility calls for the city government to issue rate regulations, stipulating a fare of, say, $6 per passenger. This would not determine a unique allocation, but if an arbitrary criterion (a cab's distance from the curb) is used to settle which cab takes two passengers and which takes one, it would prevent the bargaining impasse and result in an allocation that is as good as any other. In similar examples involving larger capacities and more prospective passengers, price regulation and essentially random assignments would result in roughly equal numbers of passengers in each cab.
The structure of the problem is not rich enough to determine what institutional arrangement will emerge, but it is clear that the transactions costs involved in various alternatives will have a major influence. 9 The 4. However, these results refer to long-run economies, and they do not rule out by any means economies over a substantial range, the effect of which is to create 1 'gaps'' in the short-run supply curve. The possibility of flat-bottomed long-run average cost curves seems to me to be of limited relevance to the question whether the integer problem is important empirically for short-run equilibria. For a different picture of the nature of costs than is implied by the survivor principle, see J. Maurice Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs (1923); and the survey by A. A. Walters, Production and Cost Functions, 31 Econometrica 1 (1963) . Note that with uncertain demand and transportation costs, the implications of the survivor principle do not hold since it becomes economical to maintain small costly plants. Aivazian and Callen present a bargaining situation similar to the one presented above. Both their case and mine have an empty core. They use the pedagogical device of successive contracts to illustrate that no competitive solution emerges, and they conclude that "the nonexistence of the core furnishes yet a further rationale for the existence of particular contractual arrangements.'' id. at 84 THE J OURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMI CS turnover of passengers may be high, ruling out collusion among passengers. On the other hand, a small and stable population of cab drivers could allow successful self-regulation or merger. If joint action by passengers or cabbies failed, or if the resulting prices were in excess of costs, government might step in. Of course, government might interfere anyway, and there is no guarantee that interference on legitimate grounds would be better than the evil aimed at. So, while the problem generated by fixed costs can be thought of as creating a fc 'natural monopoly," in the sense that independent action and the price system do not lead to the optimal result, it is not clear that the ideal solution calls for either one firm or government regulation.
This discussion can be interpreted in terms of the theory of the firm. When the problems of economic organization cannot be handled by the price system, the response is often the establishment of an organization that substitutes command for independence and the use of prices. This is what typically occurs within individual plants or production units, although the difficulty of using the price system in organizing production often leads firms to encompass more than one plant. But just as competition within prescribed limits encourages efficiency within a firm, cooperation can be useful among firms when the price system cannot ensure efficient outcomes. So, although efficient economic organization requires a mix of competition and cooperation, the two types of organization are not in one-to-one correspondence with markets and firms.
In keeping with this view, the difficulty associated with fixed costs can be thought of as one variety of market failure that requires a partial suppression of independence and the competitive mechanism. Agreements among plants, a type of self-regulation in other words, and merger are two ways of accomplishing this. Since individual discretion and responsibility in many aspects of a plant's operations may still be desirable even if fixed costs make a neoclassical competitive equilibrium impossible, the least-cost solution could be the formation of a horizontal agreement instead of a consolidated firm. In this respect a cartel resembles a franchise agreement, which also employs a combination of restriction and 181. I would add that arrangements not enforced by a court of law may also represent solutions to an empty core and that the relative costs of various arrangements will determine which one is used. As Coase observes: "While consideration of what would happen in a world of zero transactions costs can give us valuable insights, these insights are, in my view, without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the real world of positive transaction costs." Ronald H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J. Law & Econ. 183, 187 (1981) . The distance between Coase and Aivazian and Callen may be less than their exchange implies. The difficulty illuminated by an empty core points to a genuine problem in the real world, but how this difficulty is resolved undoubtedly depends on particular circumstances.
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freedom. The analogy is even closer when the terms of operation of individual franchises are governed by all franchise holders acting collectively. Not surprisingly, professional sports leagues look like monopolistic cartels at first glance. The limits to exploitation from such cooperative agreements, it should go without saying, are determined by potential competition, and the possibility of buyers integrating vertically or acting jointly.
10
The market failure story has the following implications for the turn-ofthe-century merger wave. In the absence of legal restrictions, firms preferred cartelization because this was the cheaper way of organizing their industries. This may be particularly true of cyclical industries where ordinary market frictions make it possible to recover costs during periods of high demand and in which the integer problem requires a cooperative effort only sporadically. However, when antitrust laws raised the costs of institutions that facilitated cooperation, horizontal merger often became the best available option. Sometimes firms also turned to vertical mergers since the market failure generated by fixed costs can be remedied by horizontal agreement, horizontal merger, long-term contracts (vertical price fixing in effect), or vertical merger, with the choice governed by the relevant costs and benefits.
The monopoly explanation and the market failure explanations differ in some but not all of their implications. Both predict collusion when the number of firms in the relevant market is small, but only if the cost savings from remaining a cartel outweigh the incremental gains in revenue available under single-firm monopoly. Otherwise, the firms would have been merged already. Given the apparently small diseconomies from merger implied by the survivor principle, this suggests, under the monopoly explanation, small monopoly gains from merger in those cases where firms chose to remain cartelized. The two explanations are also consistent with vertical mergers occurring in response to laws against cartels. Vertical mergers could occur under the monopoly explanation if the average (monopoly) price charged the buyer after the horizontal merger of a large part of the industry is higher than the average price charged previously by 10 I present a more detailed account of these points in Bittlingmayer, Price Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, supra note 7, at 107-14. Another important difference between merger and price fixing is that price-fixing cartels can more easily add and drop members as demand conditions change. These conditions determine the appropriate scope of the cartel. Consequently, the extension of a merger beyond the firms involved in the preceding price-fixing cartel is consistent with the merger having the same aim as the cartel. This may occur if the cartel would have expanded at about the time of the merger in the absence of merger. Concerning the mergers of 1898-1902, it should also be pointed out that some firms may have been included in a consolidation if there was a substantial chance that antimerger legislation or Supreme Court decisions would have hampered merger in the future.
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THE J OURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMI CS the cartelized industry. (This is a minimum condition since vertical integration also entails costs.) Vertical mergers could occur under the market failure explanation if the vertical mergers provided the next best solution to market failure.
The two theories do diverge at several points. The monopoly theory makes no prediction about the influence of fixed costs on the probability of collusion 11 (independent of its effects on the number of competitors), while the market failure explanation predicts that collusion is more likely the larger are each plant's fixed costs in relation to factors such as search costs and geographic dispersion. The monopoly theory also makes no prediction about the probability of collusion over the business cycle, while the market failure theory predicts that collusion is more likely in an industry downturn when the divergence between average and marginal cost is greatest.
12
Finally, the monopoly explanation predicts that collusion is less likely the easier it is to enter the industry, while the market 13 failure explanation predicts collusion even in industries with easy entry.
III. THE EVOLUTI ON OF ANTI TRUST POLI CY
This section reviews developments in antitrust policy.
14 Four points deserve emphasis: £. C. Knight made merger legal, at least in the minds 11 The ratio of fixed to variable costs is sometimes thought to be related to the likelihood of collusion, especially if the industry is operating short of capacity. It is argued that as the firm approaches bankruptcy, the benefits of price fixing (minimizing losses) increase, while the cost of price fixing stays the same. Granting this argument, consider the case where the price of the variable input increases and the industry faces inelastic demand. Although the ratio of fixed to variable costs has decreased, the divergence between fixed and variable costs has not, and the incentives to cartelization remain the same. It has also been argued that a greater divergence of fixed and variable costs makes collusion less likely because the incentives to cheat are greater. 12 See Peter Asch & J. J. Seneca, Is Collusion Profitable? 58 Rev. Econ. and Statis. 1 (1976), for evidence that price-fixing firms are less successful than firms as a whole. It should be emphasized that while the divergence between average and marginal cost (as well as between average variable and marginal cost) is usually greater during a downturn, the probability of successful collusion also depends on the likelihood that firms can enforce the collusion, and this depends partly on the length of the expected horizon over which the potential colluders can be expected to work together. If some firms are likely to leave the industry during the next downturn, agreement is less likely. One implication is that collusion is more probable, other things equal, during the start of an upswing. See Lester G. Teiser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Business 27 (1980), for an analysis of the incentives to collude under different expected horizons.
13
Perfectly frictionless entry and exit is compatible with the absence of a "sustainable" equilibrium. See Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, supra note 7, especially ch. 2; and Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly, supra note 7, ch. 5. of many lawyers; judicial policy after Knight was directed at cartels and not merger; public agitation against the cartels may have added extra impetus to the merger wave through the many new state laws and federal legislative initiatives directed at the trusts in the years 1896-1900; and the nature of the assault on the trusts in the courts and legislatures was clear to the press and the legal profession.
The pervasive cartelization of the late 1800s resulted in state antitrust legislation as early as the late 1880s, but concern over the trust issue waxed and waned. 15 The cycles of interest in controlling the trusts are evident in Table 1 . For example, the Sherman Act of 1890 was preceded in 1889 by the passage of ten antitrust statutes and constitutional amendments at the state level. This legislative effort continued for two more years, but interest in the trust issue dropped off, perhaps because of the tariff and free silver issues, perhaps because the new legislation had to be tested in the courts.
When the Sherman Act was tested in 1895 in E. C. Knight, 16 the court upheld a consolidation involving the notorious Sugar Trust. This was viewed as a setback for antitrust policy. A renewed legislative effort began in 1895, which was slowed by the election year of 1896 and the Spanish-American War of 1898. This is reflected in the data on new statutes and amendments in Table 1 . The number of mergers with capitalizations of $1 million or more is also shown, and it certainly seems that mergers and antitrust legislation may have been linked, with coincidental increases occurring in the years 1888-92 and during the second half of the 1890s. (Data on U.K. mergers are also shown, and these will be discussed in the next section.)
One widespread interpretation of Knight was that merger was legal, although price fixing might not be.
17
The origin of the view that merger 15 Cartels or trusts apparently existed in coal, oil, sugar, whiskey, cotton bagging, meat, cordage, lead, cottonseed oil, pig iron, bar iron, crucible steel, nails, stoves, oatmeal milling, drug retailing, coal dealing, ice, tiles, brewing, gunpowder, steel rails, wallpaper, railroading, candles, salt, barbed wire, and window frames and sashes. See Thorelli, supra note 14, at 74-79, 158-59, and Letwin, supra note 14, at 109. This list is not exhaustive. Interestingly, it has sometimes been claimed that these cartels were never effective. Why then, one should ask, was cartelization tried again and again in so many different industries? Were there no net benefits? The interpretation that this language made merger legal was widely adopted in the law journals and other publications,
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Knight was followed in Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (February 8, 1896 ). 'The Sherman antitrust law, as construed by the Supreme Court , , . does not apply to the most complete monopolies acquired by unlawful combination of concerns which are naturally competitive. " Id. at 1-2. A letter from John W. Griggs, Attorney General in McKinley's administration, says that the mergers of 1898 and 1899 were like the sugar combination and therefore exempt from the antitrust laws. This letter was published in the New York Herald, according to Letwin, supra note 14, at 140. The effectiveness of the Sherman Act was in doubt even before Knight. See the discussion of Attorney General Olney's views in id. at 121-22; and Thorelli, supra note 14, at 383-93.
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Northern Securities was filed as part of President Roosevelt's campaign to "control the trusts," and it was decided by a majority of five to four in a highly charged political atmosphere. Justice Holmes felt compelled to observe in his famous dissent that "great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment." Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904). Holmes, id. at 404, emphasized that contracts in restraint of trade under common law "were contracts with strangers to the contractor's business, and the trade restrained was the contractor's own." Such contracts were illegal only if they "amounted to a monopoly." Combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade "were combinations to keep strangers to the agreement out of the business." This, he claimed, was the ground for the decision in United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). "To suppress competition in that way is one thing; to suppress it by fusion is another. The Chronicle also credited the Court's decision with hampering recovery from the 1896 recession.
26
Similar consequences might have been expected in the October 1898 Joint-Traffic decision, which involved a railroad agreement specifically designed to pass antitrust muster, but which the railroads also lost. This case had a smaller effect on stock prices though, maybe because the decision was expected, maybe because, as the Chronicle suggested, legislation to permit pooling was expected.
27
In the meantime the judicial onslaught was extended directly to industrial cartels in the appeals court decision in Addyston, handed down in February 1898. The price-fixing cartel of six manufacturers of cast iron pipe was found to be in violation of the Sherman Act. The opinion in this case is now often considered a classic in the development of the per se rule against price fixing, and was written by William Howard Taft, then a judge for the sixth circuit. However, Taft was still obliged to address the implications of Knight, and he seemingly left open the door to merger. 28 Although the Chronicle was eager to put the best possible interpretation on what Taft said concerning the illegality of price-fixing agreements, noting that the "Cast Iron Pipe Trust seems to have been obnoxious in many ways," it was forced to concede that "there is a part of the dictum of the Court which seems to be of wider application, and which has been given special prominence in the newspapers." 29 The trade publication for the iron, steel, and hardware industry, Iron Age, ran a full-column editorial on the decision and concluded that merger might now replace price fixing. "The new decision is one which may gravely affect some of the arrangements now in force among manufacturers in different lines, in which some control over prices is sought by concerns otherwise acting independently in the conduct of their business. At first sight it looks as though this decision must drive them to actual consolidation, which is really more apt to be prejudicial to public interests than the losses and temporary agreements which it condemns." 30 A month later Iron Age reported that "quite a number of meetings of manufacturers have been held during the past week all looking to some scheme to take off the keen edge of unbridled competition." The general trend was summarized by a speaker in 1899 at the Chicago antitrust conference, 34 and the increased public concern with the trust question is clearly reflected in the great volume of literature that appeared even before anyone was aware that there was a merger wave. 35 All that said, the fact remains that only seven federal cases involving 
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horizontal agreements were instituted in the years 1895-99. 36 Could these cases have caused the merger of a large fraction of U.S. manfacturing? Given the hundreds of cartels that apparently operated in the 1890s, the probability of conviction (post hoc) was very small. Still, one could argue that the cost of an antitrust case is greater than the probability of getting caught times the fine. Legal costs, the opportunity costs of managers, and the implicit costs of bad publicity (more harassment in the press and from government) also have to be reckoned with. But this does not add much, given the small number of cases.
It is also true that expected costs are not the same thing as realized costs. "Everything that is, was expected," is not a valid implication of rational expectations. The trusts were a lively political issue, and if it is surprising today that antitrust enforcement got off to such a slow start in the 1890s, it is possible that the slow start may have been surprising at the time.
37
Another important feature of the uncertain political climate is that it decreases the horizon over which a cartel can be expected to operate. Since a cartel is a self-enforcing contract, and since a breach of a selfenforcing contract is more likely the shorter the expected horizon (because the losses from noncooperation are less), the antitrust agitation would imply a greater tendency for cartels to break down even in the absence of large scale convictions.
Probably the best evidence that business chafed under the prohibition against cartels is that it made continual efforts to have the Sherman Act amended. The trade press and corporation lawyers fulminated against the Sherman Act, and several attempts were made in the years 1900-1910 to change the law. For example, considerable effort was made on behalf of a bill "to legalize contracts and agreements not in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce." Table 1 . 37 The Antitrust Division was established in 1903 and given a half-million dollar appropriation. See Thorelli, supra note 14, at 537. I N THE UNI TED STATES AND UNI TED KI NGDOM, 1890-1905   Table 2 shows the remarkable increase in mergers that occurred in the late 1890s. The number of firms absorbed by merger in manufacturing and mining rose from sixty-nine to 303 between 1897 and 1898, and rose further to 1,208 in 1899. Merger disappearances in primary metals and metal products rose even more sharply over the same period. Another important point is that consolidation of several firms, rather than piecemeal acquisition, accounted for roughly 90 percent of all firm disappearances until 1902.
Firm disappearances count large and small firms alike. A better way to get an idea of the scope of the merger wave is to look at total merger capitalizations, although this involves substantial double counting when firms are formed in a series of mergers. Based on capitalization values, more than half of the merger movement in mining and manufacturing during the peak years 1899-1901 can be accounted for by mergers in metal industries. The merger movement as a whole seems to have encompassed between one-fourth and one-half of U.S. industry.
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One issue that arises in connection with the U.S. mergers at the turn of the century is that Great Britain had a merger wave at about the same time. In fact, it is possible to show that the two are related statistically. This suggests the possibility of a joint cause, apparently confined to the United States and United Kingdom. It is not clear though if the two merger movements are in fact part of the same phenomenon since there are some noteworthy differences and since statistical correlations are never enough to establish causation. A plausible joint cause has so far proved elusive. For example, there is å correlation between year-to-year changes of U.K. firm disappearances and year-to-year changes of U.S. firm disappearances by consolidation (r = .38, which is significant at the 10 percent level for twenty-three observations). But what should be done with this empirical finding? Granting the fact of a statistical relationship, I would not want to insist on a single explanation. Well-worn but valid arguments force me to observe that such results could be spurious, 42 and we have precious little in the way of a plausible common explanation. Under these circumstances, investigating the two movements one at a time strikes me as a defensible research strategy.
In examining the data we should also look to see whether merger activity is inconsistent with the timing of key antitrust decisions. Table 4 presents quarterly merger figures and some key events in antitrust history for the years 1895-1900. Bold-face numbers show where the quarterly merger figures reached a new high (beginning with the third quarter of 1895). Thus E. C. Knight was followed by three successive quarters of increased merger activity, consistent with the view that it did signal that merger was legal under the Sherman Act. Only twelve firm disappearances occurred between this mini-wave and the first quarter of 1897, when Trans-Missouri was announced and many state antitrust laws were passed. After a one-quarter lull, merger activity increased to unprecedented levels, then decreased just before the Addyston appeals decision, only to increase when the decision was announced. After another onequarter lull, merger activity increased steadily until early 1899 and remained above pre-1897 levels until the end of 1900.
It would be unrealistic to expect data of this kind to show unambiguously that Supreme Court cases caused mergers, since the lags could be variable and the cases are only a proxy for actual expected policy. Interpretations of court doctrine by prominent authorities, initiatives to amend 41 These are the years for which the data cited supra note 40 overlap. legislation, and declarations of war are all factors that could make mergers occur one or two quarters sooner or later. However, I would emphasize that increases in mergers occurred within one or two quarters or at the same time as the crucial cases, and not before or after very long delays. Statistical tests in Section VII, which use a longer time series for mergers, confirm the empirical connection between changes in antitrust policy and merger in a more formal way.
V. SOME CASE STUDI ES OF MERGER
Two well-studied industries, railroading and iron and steel, provide concrete instances in which merger followed extensive cartelization after the court decisions of 1897 and 1898. In several industries antitrust charges preceded merger, and in at least two cases we know of, the firms merged after looser arrangements were ruled out on the basis of legal advice.
A. Iron and Steel
Cartel agreements in iron and steel existed in pig iron, steel billets, steel rails, structural steel, steel plate, nails and wire, and numerous other products. 43 U.S. Steel was formed in 1901 as a holding company organized under the laws of New Jersey. Its three major components were the three largest iron and steel producers in the United States: the Carnegie Company, the Federal Steel Company, and the National Steel Company. U.S. Steel also assumed control of a number of producers of finished goods that dominated their fields, including the American Tin Plate Company, the American Steel and Wire Company, and the National Tube Company, and it absorbed substantial transportation and mining facilities that had previously been independent firms. In turn, two of the major steel companies that became part of U.S. Steel, Federal and National Steel, were themselves formed through mergers in 1898, as were many of the producers of finished products. For example, the American Steel and Wire Company was organized in April of 1898 out of fourteen mills, and the successor consolidation, with twenty-nine plants in 1900, owned nearly every wire, wire rod, and wire nail plant in the United States. The Wire Nail Association had cartelized this industry in the mid-1890s. 44 The connection between price fixing and merger in the steel industry can probably be explored at greater length, but the major developments in this industry certainly make it reasonable to infer that merger performed some of the function of the abandoned cartels. The mergers also occurred at just the right time to raise the suspicion that they were a response to legal developments. In addition, iron and steel provides a classic industry where production takes place under fixed costs and where transportation costs were probably high enough to create regional markets with small numbers of competitors. 
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B. Railroading
Railroading provides another instance in which production is carried out with substantial fixed expenses, and in which the relevant market (transportation between two points) frequently has few competitors. In addition, railroad cartels were the focus of the first two significant cartel cases to reach the Supreme Court. 46 Railroads had passed through trying times in the early and mid-1890s. Although the 1887 Act to Regulate Commerce had prohibited pooling (apparently to satisfy one senator and on an experimental basis), 47 pooling agreements continued to be prevalent. These agreements faltered in the mid-1890s however, possibly because of their shadowy legal status. Two major recessions also occurred in that decade, and some combination of low freight rates and low freight volume caused many railroads to go into receivership. Although some railroad consolidations had been undertaken in the mid-1890s, their number increased sharply after the Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic decisions. This is evident in the data on mergers for twelve-month periods ending in June that are displayed in Table 5 . Mergers increased substantially in 1897, following Trans-Missouri, and declined while Joint Traffic wound its way to the Supreme Court. This case was decided in October of 1898, and mergers and consolidations increased for the period July 1898-1899. Over the next twelve months, ending June 1900, mergers increased to a new high.
The effect of these mergers is also reflected in the growth of class 1 railroads-those with 1,000 miles or more of track, also shown in Table 5 . The number of class 1 railroads increased from forty-four to fifty-one (or 16 percent) between June 1899 and June 1902. In addition, the larger 23 percent increase in class 1 mileage suggests that a good deal of the overall growth came from existing class 1 roads. The percentage of railroad mileage under class 1 control increased from 57 percent in 1899 to 65 percent in 1902.
Merger was only one way of achieving coordinated operation of different railroads. Another method, pioneered by Standard Oil and adopted by the railroads in 1899, was the "community of interest," which formed the basis for the "great systems'' associated with Morgan, Gould, Harriman, and others. probably stimulated some consolidations among railroads even before these court decisions were made. Consistent with this, Table 5 shows that an annual average of about 2 percent of U.S. mileage was merged or consolidated over the years 1890-96. However, serious legislative efforts were made to permit pooling and to reform the regulation of railroads in other ways in the late 1890s and ensuing years.
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The overall effect of these two influences was probably to soften the impact of the two railroad cases.
C. Shoe Machinery and Explosives
In at least two instances we have evidence that legal advice regarding the illegality of looser forms of organization played a role in inducing firms to merge. United Shoe 53 concerned a consolidation conceived in 1898 and undertaken in order to evade the antitrust laws, according to testimony of a key figure. This was noted in a dissent by Justice Clarke, who also thought that Trans-Missouri had suggested that there might be legal problems. The antitrust laws were also mentioned in connection with the consolidation of Du Pont properties in 1903. Following the acquisition of several explosives plants, the executive committee of the Du Pont Company addressed the question of firm organization. The decisive factor, which was stressed by both lawyers who had been asked for advice, was that the existing arrangements, involving both cartel agreements and distinct subsidiaries, were "absolutely illegal."
Walker [one of the lawyers hired by Du Pont] particularly stressed that the Supreme Court, in its interpretations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, had opposed practices restricting production. On the other hand, Walker continued, 4 'the restrictions placed on large aggregations of capital are not intended to prevent legitimate expansion of business, however large." The Chicago lawyer pointed to the E. C. Knight case of 1895 in which the Court found the American Sugar Company not guilty, even though it controlled 90% of the sugar production in the United States, because it had "no intermediate selling company or corporation and no exclusive sales contracts." Then in the Addyston Pipe and Steel case of 1899 the Court dissolved the contract among six companies that set up exclusive marketing areas for each of the six firms. Moreover, Walker was certain that in the Northern Securities case then pending before the Supreme Court, the use of a holding company to restrain production or control competition would be declared illegal. "I would avoid," he concluded, "all 'entangling alliances' or contracts, but stand simply on the legality of your incorporation and the management and conduct of its corporate business.
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These legal views illustrate several plausible consequences of the Supreme Court's antitrust decisions. First Knight does seem to have been thought of as sanctioning merger. Second, Addyston appears to have been thought of as more than a simple price-fixing case. One lawyer apparently thought that it outlawed exclusive territories even in the case where the firms might be subsidiaries of the same holding company. It seems strange today, but a turn-of-the-century lawyer probably saw a close connection between price-fixing agreements and other sorts of business relations. This is reflected in the legal literature, 56 as well as in Taft's "harmonious arrangement" or "working agreement" because "I had a sort of indefinite fear that it might be deemed to be a combination in restraint of trade. ... I had an indefinite fear that if the two companies remained separate but, for instance, had a joint factory and joint branch offices, there might be something in the way of restraint of trade. I insisted, for that reason, that there should be a complete merger and consolidation." Quoted in United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 247 U.S. 32, 77 (1918). . I thank Alfred Chandler for directing me to this passage in response to an inquiry. Haney, supra note 32, at 244-45, summarizes the substitution of complete merger for looser forms and claims that the aim was in part to "gain a stronger legal position." Similarly, Haney, id. 2d 243, attributes the 1904 consolidation in the tobacco industry to concern about vulnerability to antitrust. opinion in Addyston, which takes great pains to distinguish cartel agreements from other arrangements between firms. 57 Third, this account shows that Northern Securities influenced how lawyers thought about the legality of the holding company, even, as here, before the decision was handed down.
D. Cotton Oil, Sugar, Cast Iron Pipe, Oil Refining, and Meat Packing
In another important class of mergers consolidation followed closely on the heels of antitrust action directed against specific cartels. At least five mergers fit this description: the reorganization in 1889 of the Cotton Oil Trust, 
E. The View of an Important Promoter
Charles R. Flint was a leading promoter of turn-of-the-century mergers who mentioned the antitrust laws as an important cause of the consolidations. His observations deserve some attention, partly because his analysis of the gains and losses from large firms has the ring of a familiar economic argument. The drawback to the merger of several industrial firms, Flint might say today, is that it creates a principal-agent problem.
While the financial interest of the individual entrusted with the local management of the sub-company or plant is as large as before, his percentage of interest, owing to its being merged with other concerns, is very much less, and the inducement of exertion and economy is not as large as before. In the export and import business we are able clearly to divide our business into departments, according to countries or staples, interesting each head in the department he manages. Here 57 United States v. Addyston, 85 Fed. 271, 281-83 (6th Cir. 1898). The distinction seems to have been hard to draw; Taft's test for distinguishing good from bad restraints is termed "circular" in Posner & Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 110. The possibility that the cartels may have been viewed as part of a larger class of agreements raises the question whether other sorts of agreements besides classic cartels may have been converted to merged firms because of concern about antitrust. Although not converted through merger, General Electric and Westinghouse had an agreement on the joint use of patents. See Thorelli, supra note 14, at 271. 58 Thorelli, supra note 14, at 79. 59 Eichner, supra note 16, at 6. 60 Bittlingmayer, Price Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, supra note 7, at 85. 61 Haney, supra note 32, at 215. the departments are independent. But in the case of the consolidation of manufacturing operations, such an arrangement is very difficult, as there is likely to be a conflict of interest, owing to their interdependence. It is therefore undesirable to have any individual interested otherwise than in the common result.
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Flint mentioned several advantages to merger against which this problem had to be weighed. Among the more or less innocuous gains are discounts on raw materials, the specialization of plants, the regulation of product diversity, economies of distribution, and inventory savings. To this he added the prevention of price cutting and the "demoralization'' of business that occurs during business downturns. "Under industrial combination, however, each concern obtains a fair share of the reduced prices; and the contraction of business is conducted with the orderliness of a retreat of a well-disciplined army."
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Flint did not think merger was the ideal solution, however, and, as the quotation above shows, he seems to have preferred a looser form that preserved some of the independence of individual plants while controlling prices. In testimony before the Industrial Commission, Flint was asked what sort of trust legislation he favored. He replied that he thought it was difficult to draft beneficial legislation and that the existing antitrust laws had tended to force mergers.
My idea is that affairs of trade are best regulated by natural laws. It is very difficult to suggest legislation of any radical character that can supplant to advantage the natural law of supply and demand. For instance, the courts in Germany have sustained the agreements which we call restraint of trade agreements. The result of this has been that there have been fewer combinations in Germany. In this country laws have been passed against agreements between corporations for the purpose of regulating trade. Well, that very legislation has had a tendency to force organization of industrial combinations. The legislators who formulated the restraint of trade laws did not anticipate that those very laws would be one of the strongest reasons for bringing about the organization of industrial combinations.
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In summary, Flint saw the lack of appropriate incentives as a major cost of merger, he thought merger prevented price cutting during recessions but (reading between the lines) at a greater cost than price fixing, and he attributed a large fraction of the U.S. merger activity to the antitrust law.
F. An Overview of Changing Industry Organization
The costs associated with single-firm organization are also consistent with the determined search for some federative or decentralized industry organization, whether authentic trusts or other devices, such as pools, price-fixing agreements, holding companies, or "communities of interest," that were often called trusts. The specific circumstances of an industry dictated what was the best form of organization, subject to the constraints of the evolving antitrust law and of the formidable but limited creativity of corporation lawyers and company officials desirous of finding ways around the law. Broadly speaking, the legal attack on the trusts and cartels in the late 1880s led to the first round of mergers and, in one case, the first community of interest; the renewed attack on pools and price fixing led to merger through complete consolidation; and the holding company, whose potential was discovered in 1899, became a popular merger device until it proved to be susceptible in 1904 to a rule of reason. Complete merger appears to have been a last resort in many cases. It is interesting that the most earnestly pursued monopoly, Standard Oil, was the first trust, the first community of interest, and the first of the new generation of holding companies in its various incarnations.
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One objection to the idea that mergers create diseconomies of management is that the firms in an industry can merge and achieve through internal decentralization the economies that come from independent responsibility and action. So, the argument goes, it cannot be true that the firms merged reluctantly and at the expense of a lower-cost form of organization. This observation has some drawbacks. First, it makes the question of industry organization open-ended, posing the same difficulty for the study of firm size as is usually implied by the assumption of constant returns to scale. If there were no costs to merger, why did firms not merge before 1898? Second, it breaks the connection between forms of business organization that are legal and any real or presumptive benefits. If there were no connection, then it would have been an easy matter to set up a sham corporation in the face of legal action against a cartel and continue as before. However, in practice, ownership rights of individual shareholders in a merged firm are general, and the concern of the shareholders will be to maximize the value of the entire enterprise. Consequently, this implies the necessity of imposing restrictions on managers who can no longer be allowed to maximize the value of individual plants because of the detrimental effect this would have on the firm as a whole. A sham merger, one in which the rights and obligations of shareholders were left unaffected, would very likely have come under attack 66 This thumbnail sketch comes from Haney, supra note 32; and Chandler, The Visible Hand, supra note 48, chs. 9-11. Chandler in particular stresses the emergence of new administrative forms. This was an important long-term development that may have been accelerated or influenced by antitrust legislation, as Chandler suggests. Id. at 332-34.
for abusing the corporate form, and the legal doctrines involved in "piercing the corporate veil" would have come into play. So, although merging firms can pick from a range of organizational forms, that range was probably not large enough to allow them to mimic exactly the incentives available under complete independence.
VI. ECONOMI STS AND THE 1898-1902 MERGER WAVE
The idea that antitrust policy played a significant role in the Great Merger Wave has received a cool welcome in modern studies of turn-ofthe-century antitrust policy and merger activity. It fared somewhat better in the first few decades after the mergers took place, although the topic never seemed worthy of extensive study. Lewis Haney, in an insightful analysis of the structure and function of various forms of business organization, mentioned the role of antitrust several times in passing.
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Eliot Jones devoted most of the chapter "The Modern Trust Movement" in his 1921 book The Trust Problem in the United States to a description of the various forms the trust could take, and he mentioned briefly that the antitrust laws had caused firms to adopt tight consolidations. 68 He quoted the passage from United Shoe Machinery that suggests that antitrust policy may have caused merger in that case, but he did not comment on whether antitrust policy was a cause of the consolidation in the steel industry, focusing instead on "the desire to restrict or eliminate competition." 69 J. M. Clark speculated that the antitrust laws, among other factors, drove the cartels to merger, 70 and a Brookings publication that appeared in 1939 emphasizes that Knight made merger legal, but attributes the mergers to the expansion of the late 1890s.
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Many of the classic works on the trust issue view the rise of the trust, broadly defined, as the main issue, and seem to regard the choice among trust forms as a relatively minor question. Consequently, they emphasize the nineteenth century's falling price level, the development of railroads, the rise of large scale production and similar long-term developments, but they do not mention antitrust. By the 1950s the notion was viewed with much skepticism. George Stigler gives primary consideration to changes in corporation law initiated by New Jersey in the late 1880s and to the growth of the New York Stock Exchange "into an effective market for industrial securities." 73 The growth of the exchange, Stigler argues, allowed promoters to capitalize monopoly gains. He plays down the role of antitrust. "The effectiveness of the Sherman Law in dealing with conspiracies was not clear until 1899, when the Addyston Pipe case was decided; and there was a contemporaneous wave of amalgamations in England, where conspiracies were unenforceable but not actionable." 74 I have tried to show that the decisions before 1899 should not be discounted and that the British mergers did not necessarily result from the same influences. Looking at corporation law and securities markets as "causes" also raises questions. U.S. railroad securities were traded for many decades before 1900 in both the United States and the United Kingdom. 75 It is difficult to imagine that the liquidity of securities markets increased so rapidly because of innovations in communication, say, that one industry after another became consolidated in a five-year period. It seems just as sensible to say that the formation of large firms increased the demand for liquid securities markets.
The role of the new corporation laws is also less than clear. New Jersey allowed holding companies and permitted corporations to exchange stock for property in 1889, nine years before the merger wave began. Other states soon passed similar legislation. 76 It is possible that states competed for corporations following the actions taken against trusts in the late 1890s. Another fact that has to be faced is that a number of industrial and railroad mergers took place between 1888 and 1893, proving that it could be done. Why did most firms wait until after 1897? In addition, corporations could consolidate before 1889 with special permission of state legis- Figure 1 shows the number of antitrust cases instituted by the Department of Justice for the years 1890-1950. It also shows several merger series that jointly cover the same period. The number of cases is a poor measure of antitrust policy, in part because this aggregate lumps together price fixing and other types of cases. But we have to make do. Important developments for antitrust, which should also have an effect on merger, are marked below the graph.
Beginning in 1904 and up to the late 1940s, there seems to have been a connection between the two series. This covers the period between Northern Securities and the Cellar-Kefauver Amendment. Between 1904 and the early 1920s there are four cycles of antitrust enforcement matched by four cycles of merger activity. The first ended in 1908, when the Hepburn Bill-a legislative proposal that would have allowed price fixing-was being considered. That effort failed, and mergers increased sharply and then decreased during the years that reform of the antitrust laws was being considered again, hitting their lowest point for the years 1900-1920 in 1914, when the legislative labor gave birth to the FTC and Clayton Acts. The third and fourth cycles are really one, interrupted by the First World War, when industry was cartelized by government.
One feature of this data, confirmed below in econometric results, is the tendency for changes in merger activity to lead changes in case filings. This can mean either that merger caused more cases to be filed or that case filings represented earlier changes in policy. Although yearly data on the number of merger and price-fixing cases are not available, five-year averages of charges filed from 1904 through 1925 indicate that only 18 percent of all cases involved monopolization charges, while 71 percent involved horizontal agreements. 91 Note also that the number of cases filed underwent fairly dramatic swings, making it unlikely that budget cutbacks due to business cycles or other extraneous factors caused the periodic declines in case filings if the Department of Justice operated under roughly constant returns to scale.
The 1920s merger wave is usually considered to be the second important one after the 1898-1902 movement. The actual "wave" can probably be dated at 1925-29. Carl Eis emphasizes the lax merger policies in his study of these mergers.
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This is consistent with the evidence from the earlier merger wave, but the two periods may have had an increasingly stringent cartel policy in common as well. Not only did the Supreme Court reestablish the per se rule in 1927 in Trenton Potteries, but the number of horizontal conspiracy cases filed in 1920-24 (fifty cases) and 1925-29 (thirty-six cases) was greater than in all preceding five-year periods except 1910-14. It was also greater than in the next two five-year periods.
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A renewed effort to change the antitrust laws followed the 1927 case, and case filings also decreased. The number of mergers decreased at the same time, remaining low through the first two terms of the Roosevelt administration. However, case filings increased substantially in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and the number of mergers increased directly after this 180 degree change in policy. This sort of graph reading certainly does not prove a connection, but it does provide the outlines of one explanation for large swings in merger activity before passage of the CellarKefauver Amendment and before price fixing had become illegal permanently and beyond all doubt. 91 Posner, supra note 36, at 398. Posner, supra note 36, at 398. Himmelberg, supra note 88, at 54-57, argues that Republican policy in the mid-1920s, although lenient toward trade association activities, was severe with regard to out-and-out price fixing.
Some statistical results support the likelihood of a link between mergers and case filings. In the results that follow yearly merger activity for the years 1895-1920 is regressed on case filings, stock price changes, and dummy variables covering periods where antitrust policy underwent changes. Stock price changes are included because the weak statistical association between stock prices and merger is one explanationalthough an explanation without a theory-that has often been proposed as a cause of cycles in merger activity. The dummy variables are a necessary evil because they are the only way of taking into account the key policy changes. The problem with using dummies, of course, is that the data are made up, so to speak, and given enough dummies, it would be possible to explain just about any time series. I will define three: one for 1898-1902 (the period between Trans-Missouri and the initiation of Northern Securities)', 1899 (the year following Joint Traffic and the Addyston Court of Appeals decision); and 1896 and 1908-16 (the period covering the Hepburn Bill, the "monopolization" prosecutions of the Taft administration, the FTC and Clayton Acts, and the creation of exempt industries, as well as the 1896 political uncertainty).
The most striking feature of Table 6 is that the dummy variables for 1898 and 1898-1902 provide strong and consistent support for the view that those years were special, even taking into account the influence of stock prices. The dummy for policy uncertainty (1896, , on the other hand, shows a strong negative effect. Also of interest, the number of antitrust cases has as much explanatory power as stock returns. Current stock returns are more strongly related than either lagged or leading stock returns. In contrast, antitrust cases from past years are negatively related and from future years positively related to merger. Since case filings represent policy initiatives that had their origins before a given case was filed, the negative association of earlier case filings with current mergers suggests at first glance the perverse inference that mergers in the current period are stimulated by a lax price-fixing policy initiated more than a year ago. This is probably a statistical fluke that comes from the see-saw nature of antitrust enforcement. The positive association of next year's case filings with current merger activity comes closer to capturing an intelligible relationship since it takes time to prepare cases and since an administration will usually reveal before case filings are made what its stance on antitrust issues will be. 
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The last two columns of Table 6 show that when filings are used as explanatory variables the effect that can be credited to stock returns falls off. My guess about this is that stock prices partly changed in response to developments in antitrust. The Dow-Jones average used in these regressions was composed chiefly of railroad stocks and stocks of corporations that had been formed in the 1898-1902 merger wave, and these are precisely the firms that had an interest in the interpretation and enforcement of the Sherman Act. As each of several crises in antitrust policy came and went (the years 1904, 1908, and 1914 provide examples), stock prices may have dropped and then risen as it became clear that more radical solutions to the trust problem-such as dissolution of firms that happened also to be in the Dow-Jones index-were being passed up in favor of renewed dedication to catching price fixers.
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Similar arguments would hold for more broadly defined indexes, since a large fraction of industrial stocks were issued by firms formed in the Great Merger Wave.
The results so far have used firm disappearances through merger in mining and manufacturing as the dependent variable. Examination of the data revealed that mining disappearances, chiefly in coal mining, accounted for a large fraction of disappearances (17 percent for the years 1895-1920) and were very variable. For example, they accounted for 43 percent of the total in 1905. In addition, it seemed desirable to break down the regressions by the two types of merger, consolidation and acquisition. The regression results in Table 7 show an even weaker effect of stock returns on manufacturing disappearances than on manufacturing and mining disappearances. They also show a much stronger relation between antitrust case filings and acquisition than between antitrust case filings and consolidation. On the other hand, consolidation seems largely to have been a response to events in 1898-1902 and does not appear to have been affected at all by the periods of "policy uncertainty" (1896, or by case filings. One possibility is that acquisition was more sensitive to the antitrust climate, but it seems more likely that the large number of consolidations in the years 1898-1902 imparted so much variability to the data over those years that the more subtle effects of case filings and the periods of policy uncertainty are lost. 
VIII. CONCLUSI ON
Did antitrust policy cause the merger wave that began in the late 1890s? An assessment of what the key court decisions said and how they were interpreted makes it reasonable to suppose that merger was legal while cartels were not. This was at least a widespread view, and these decisions (Knight, Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, and Taffs Addyston opinion) enjoyed prominent play in newspapers and legal publications.
The timing of the mergers is consistent with this story. There was a brief flurry of mergers in the late 1880s-around the time the first antitrust laws were passed and the trusts were first brought into the courts. There was another increase after E. C. Knight, and finally an unprecedented number of mergers in 1898 following a new outcry against the trusts and a series of court cases that held price fixing to be illegal. Merger activity decreased substantially while Northern Securities was litigated.
Other evidence comes from particular industries. The mergers in several industries-cotton oil, sugar, cast iron pipe, oil, and meat packingappear to have been the result of antitrust action taken against cartels in those industries. In other cases-shoe machinery and explosives-merger was apparently undertaken on the advice of attorneys worried about the antitrust laws. Steel and railroading, two heavily cartelized industries, resorted to merger at a substantially greater pace beginning in 1898, and a major promoter of consolidations claimed that the antitrust laws increased the number of U.S. mergers. In addition to merger, another device, the community of interest, seems also to have sprung up in the late 1890s in railroading as a substitute for cartel agreements.
Data from later years suggest that antitrust policy continued to influence the number of mergers. Northern Securities resulted in fewer consolidations and more acquisitions. There is a strong, positive statistical relationship between merger and the number of antitrust case filings during the years 1904 to 1920, and a more casual investigation suggests that the merger wave of the late 1920s may have been related to increased case filings and the reestablishment of the per se rule, and that the merger wave of the 1940s may have been a response to the antimonopoly campaign of 1939-42.
Any explanation has to be evaluated against the alternatives. The mergers grew so rapidly and encompassed so many different industries that it seems reasonable to look first at policy intervention-a change in corporation laws or a change in cartel policy, for example. The obvious difficulty with the corporation law argument is that the laws were changed a decade before the mergers took place. It also begs the question, Why was the law changed? It seems more reasonable, I think, that mergers in 1898 and 1899 were caused by court cases decided in 1897 and 1898. While the British mergers of the 1880s and 1890s represent a challenge to this seemingly straightforward interpretation of the evidence, it seems defensible at the very least to say that the U.S. merger movement was larger and more pronounced by a great enough margin to merit special attention.
I have also tried to revive an old controversy that the evidence seems to invite. Were the cartels and mergers caused by the desire for monopoly or by the desire to prevent ruinous competition? Both explanations are consistent with the notion that the 1898-1902 mergers were caused by the court cases of 1897 and 1898. However, many firms apparently preferred the less secure collusion of a cartel until the late 1890s, suggesting that the monopoly gains from merger may not have been very great. So it certainly seems worthwhile to consider explanations that do not posit monopoly gain as the reason for collusion and for merger induced by a law against price fixing.
The view that collusion and merger were both responses to unavoidable market imperfections stemming from fixed costs has some advantages considered purely as theory, and it also receives some support from the
